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Form over Substance?  
China’s Contribution to Human Rights 
through Universal Periodic Review
Rhona Smith1
1.   INTRODUCTION
This article will analyse the Chinese contribution to the first cycle of the 
Human Rights Council’s universal periodic review. In 2006, the then new 
U.N. Human Rights Council2 was tasked with establishing the modalities 
of a universal periodic review of compliance by all U.N. member states 
with human rights and humanitarian law, irrespective of which treaties 
any state has elected to ratify. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and voluntary commitments of states can be used to discern the salient 
human rights standard, filling any gaps in a state’s framework of human 
rights’ obligations derived from their treaty ratifications.  China was a 
vocal member of the Like Minded Group in the U.N. during this forma-
tive period and succeeded in securing a General Assembly, then Human 
Rights Council, resolution which reflected the group’s view of universal 
periodic review.
An integral part of the review process is “peer review” of the per-
formance of states by other states. China has been very active during 
this inter-governmental process, contributing to the majority of reviews. 
here is some literature and civil society reports on China’s experience of 
universal periodic review, on universal periodic review generally, and on 
China’s engagement with the U.N. and international human rights. How-
ever, there is no detailed qualitative analysis of the approach China took 
to its interventions in the interactive dialogue of other states. his article 
will ill that gap. Using the comments made on behalf of China in all peri-
1 Professor of International Human Rights, Northumbria University. his article 
was submitted and accepted for publication in 2012.
2 G.A. Res. 60/251, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (Apr. 3, 2006).
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odic reviews (taken as the reports of the working group on the interactive 
dialogue element of the review3), an attempt will be made to categorise the 
comments made by China. It will thus be possible to discern the nature 
of rights and issues China elected to focus on during its interventions. It 
will be interesting to see whether this matches areas identiied by China in 
its voluntary human rights commitments, rights and freedoms expressed 
in treaties ratiied, the millennium development goals and other docu-
mentation. Moreover it will be instructive to compare the areas identiied 
by China for comment with those areas identiied as areas of progress or 
concern by third states in China’s own periodic review.
he article concludes with some observations on whether China’s 
approach to the irst cycle of universal periodic review embodies “form” 
(overt participation), over “substance,” and thus whether or not China is 
making a meaningful contribution to the advancement of human rights 
through this mechanism. 
2.   UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW
China is perhaps not regarded as the most fervent advocate of international 
human rights’ standards, and the international (UN) monitoring systems.4 
Perhaps it is thus surprising that China has proven to be a very enthusias-
tic participant in the newest human rights monitoring system, universal 
periodic review. Indeed, as will be seen, China has proven to be one of the 
most active and most positive participants in the world. This development 
sits alongside the growth in stature of China on the international stage, 
joining the World Trade Organisation in 2001 and embracing human rights 
3 All key documentation on universal periodic review is in the public domain, 
available at www.ohchr.org. Note that this article uses the English language version 
of all documents, where unavailable, the French language version was used as an 
alternative.
4 A number of NGOs regularly criticise China’s human rights performance, as do a 
number of States – for perhaps predictable examples, see Amnesty International: 
China, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/china; Human Rights Watch: China 
and Tibet, http://www.hrw.org/asia/china; U.S. Department of State, Annual 
Human Rights Reports – Latest Report on China, available at http://www.state.
gov/documents/organization/186478.pdf. China refutes most, if not all, the claims 
made.
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as a concept, albeit perhaps with “Chinese characteristics.”5
During the formative stages of the Council (pre and post-establish-
ment), China led the Like Minded Group6 who were against singling out 
any states for criticism or comment within the new Council.7 In such a way, 
it was proposed that the Council would establish itself as diferent from 
the Commission, which latterly was besmirched by allegations of bias and 
selective persecution or condoning of states on factors more attributable to 
that states’ allies and power base rather than purely on the facts available.8 
During a meeting between the General Assembly President and the (now 
former) Commission of Human Rights, China’s ambassador conveyed the 
views of the Like Minded Group, welcoming the decision of the General 
Assembly to create the Human Rights Council: “Human rights is not about 
5 See, e.g., Information Office of the State Council of the People’s of 
Republic of China, Human Rights in China (1991), available at http://www.
china.org.cn/e-white/7/index.htm. Part X of this elaborates China’s involvement 
in International Human Rights activities: “Consideration should be given to 
the difering views on human rights held by countries with diferent political, 
economic and social systems, as well as diferent historical, religious and cultural 
backgrounds. International human rights activities should be carried on in the 
spirit of seeking common ground while reserving diferences, mutual respect, 
and the promotion of understanding and cooperation.”
6 Algeria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, 
Viet Nam, and Zimbabwe.
7 For a more detailed exposition of this, see Philip Alston, Reconceiving the UN 
Human Rights Regime: Challenges confronting the new UN Human Rights Council, 
7 Melbourne Journal of International Law (2006).
8 See, e.g., he Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards development, security 
and human rights for all, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005); Henning Boekle, 
Western States, the UN Commission on Human Rights, and the ‘1235’ Procedure: 
he question of bias revisited, 13 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 
367 (1995); and more recently, see Patrizia Scanella & Peter Splinter, he United 
Nations Human Rights Council: A promise to be fulilled, 7 Human Rights 
Law Review 41 (2007); Nico Schrijver, he UN Human Rights Council: A new 
‘society of the committed’ or just old wine in new bottles?, 20 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 809 (2007).
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the preach and the preached, the condemn and the condemned.”9 hat the 
Commission ceased to be a credible human rights body appeared agreed, 
opinions on how best to ameliorate the situation difered. Nevertheless, a 
major cultural shit from the perceived practice of the Commission10 was 
supported by the Like Minded Group and, indeed, most of the United 
Nations’ membership.11
he Council was established and held its irst session in June 2006, by 
which time the Economic and Social Council had disbanded its Commis-
sion on Human Rights. With a more transparent, geographically represen-
tative membership, China ofered its candidature for election to member-
ship of the inaugural Council.12 It was duly elected, with its membership 
renewed for a further three years.13 Note that it is no longer a member as 
the rules prevent any state from serving more than two consecutive terms.14 
Of course, China can present its candidature thereater should, as seems 
highly probable, the government so desire. (he former Commission had 
no such restriction; thus some states sat on it for a decade or more, others 
almost permanently.) Many functions of the Commission were taken on 
(subject to a review and rationalisation process) by the Council. However, 
the Council also had some new functions, powers and responsibilities, re-
lecting in part the shit in emphasis from the Commission to the Council 
and the perceived needs of the international community almost sixty years 
9 Statement by H.E. Ambassador SHA Zukang, on behalf of the Like Minded 
Group, at the Meeting between the President of the General Assembly and the 
Commission on Human Rights, Nov. 25, 2005.
10 China was a member of the Commission from 1981, having previously attended 
as an observer.
11 Indeed, only Israel, USA, Palau and the Marshall Islands voted against G.A. Res. 
60/251, with Belarus, Iran and Venezuela abstaining.
12 he Council has forty-seven Member States, elected taking into account their 
contribution to the promotion and protection of human rights, their voluntary 
pledges and other human rights commitments (G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 2, 
¶¶ 7-8).
13 For the Note Verbale on Pledges and Commitments of the Chinese Government 
leading up to the second election, see U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess. 83d pleb. mtg, U.N. 
Doc. A/63/840 (Apr. 30, 2009).
14 G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 2, ¶ 7.
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ater the Commission drated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
establishing the basis for the modern international human rights system.
Perhaps the major innovation in the General Assembly resolution 
establishing the Human Rights Council in 200615 was the introduction 
of universal periodic review as a mechanism for considering “the fulil-
ment by each State of its human rights obligations and commitments in 
a manner which ensures universality of coverage and equal treatment 
with respect to all States.”16 Universal periodic review, applying equally 
to all states, is clearly in keeping with the anti-selectivity stance evinced 
by the Like Minded Group,17 which certainly inluenced the formative 
stages of development. Arguably the inal text of GA resolution 60/251 
and, indeed, the further elucidation of the modalities of review in Human 
Rights Council resolution 5/1 (the institution-building resolution)18 relects 
China’s idea of a more supportive environment to encourage the promotion 
and protection of human rights. his found expression in the founding 
resolution (“the work of the council shall be guided by the principles of 
... impartiality, objectivity and non-selectivity, constructive international 
dialogue and cooperation”19) and the institution-building resolution of the 
Council itself (“the universal periodic review should: . . . be conducted in 
an objective, transparent, non-selective, constructive, non-confrontational 
and non-politicised manner”20).
Universal periodic review is the only human rights monitoring system 
to which every U.N. Member state submits. his process is compulsory, in 
15 G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 2.
16 Id. ¶ 5(e). For a discussion of this process, see, inter alia, Felice Gaer, A Voice not 
an Echo: Universal periodic review and the UN treaty body system, 7(1) Human 
Rights Law Review 109 (2007); Nadia Bernaz, Reforming the UN Human 
Rights Protection Procedures: A legal perspective on the establishment of the 
Universal Periodic Review mechanism, in New Institutions for Human Rights 
Protection 75-92 (K. Boyle ed., Oxford University Press 2009).
17 Statement by SHA, supra note 9.
18 Human Rights Council Res. 5/1 Institution-building of the New Human Rights 
Council, U.N. Human Rights Council, 9th mtg, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/5/1 (June 
18, 2007).  
19 G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 2, ¶ 4.
20 Human Rights Council Res 5/1, supra note 18, ¶ 3(g).
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terms of the enabling resolution (GA Res 60/251), and comparatively new: 
the irst cycle, covering all states, began in 2008 and completed late 2011 
(twelve sessions were held); the second cycle has only just commenced (its 
irst session was held May/June 2012). Indeed, perhaps to the surprise of 
sceptics, every U.N. member state complied with the new obligation to 
participate in the process, whether or not they voted in favour thereof dur-
ing the initial U.N. General Assembly debates. Haiti was the only state to 
seek an exception, the exceptional circumstance of the earthquake of 2010 
being suicient to move Haiti from its initial scheduled review to the last 
session (October 2011). Every other state participated as and when sched-
uled, although a few states were not able to submit the national report in 
time and thus attested orally to their human record.21 On paper, therefore, 
the mechanism delivered – for the irst time the U.N. secured a complete 
set of documentation on human rights in each and every member state. 
Inevitably the veracity of all the material can be questioned and, of course, 
the eicacy of peer review as a mechanism for ensuring respect for, and 
protection of, human rights is not yet clear. However, what is beyond debate 
is that no other U.N. system captures such information and self-evaluations 
of human rights in each and every state.22
his universal periodic review process is predicated on peer review, 
with each state submitting a national self-evaluation report of the hu-
man rights situation pertaining in its jurisdiction.23 his information 
is supplemented by two documents prepared by the Oice of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights: a compilation of information on the 
21 See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the 
Universal Periodic Review Cape Verde, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/81 (Jan. 12, 2009) 
(statement by the head of delegation from the Ministry of Justice on the barriers 
to submitting a national report). South Africa submitted an oral national report 
to the irst session of the irst cycle. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of 
the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review South Africa, ¶ 3(a), U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/8/32 (May 23, 2008).
22 Few states have ratiied every core U.N. human rights treaty and submit promptly 
to reviews of the fulilment of their treaty obligations by the salient expert treaty 
monitoring bodies. he treaty body mechanism is thus, by deinition patchy, being 
predicated on ratiication by States of treaties.
23 See Human Rights Council Res. 5/1, supra note 18, ¶15 for speciication of the 
documentation on which the review focuses.
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state gathered from pre-existing U.N. treaty body, specialized agency and 
other reports; and “additional, credible and reliable information” provided 
by other stakeholders including, for example, non-governmental organi-
zations.24 hree Human Rights Council member states are selected (by 
lot) as rapporteurs to lead each review.25 Central to the actual review is a 
working group during which interactive dialogue between the state under 
review and the Council takes place. Over the course of some three hours,26 
any U.N. member state (or observer state27) can seek to make comments, 
recommendations or raise questions on the human rights situation within 
the state under review, with the state given appropriate opportunity to re-
spond during the working group session and, following due consideration, 
thereater. he rapporteur states then oversee the drating of a report of 
24 he Like Minded Group indicated support for improving the participation of 
NGOs in the work of the Council – see SHA, supra note 9. During China’s own 
review, over sixty stakeholders, alone or in collation with others, contributed to 
the stakeholder’s comments. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Working Group 
on the Universal Periodic Review, Summary Prepared by he Oice of the High 
Commissioner For Human Rights, in accordance with paragraph 15 (C) of the Annex 
to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1, People’s Republic of China (Including 
Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions (HKSAR) and (MSAR)), 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/4/CHN/3 (Jan. 5, 2009). Of these, several groups were 
recognised by the U.N. Economic and Social Council as having non-governmental 
status, including the All China Women’s Federation in Beijing, China Family 
Planning Association, Beijing, and the China Society for Human Rights Study 
in China, Human Rights Watch (Switzerland) and Amnesty International (UK) 
– the latter two are, of course, not recognised in China. Several others were in 
China, including China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, Hong Kong 
Human Rights Commission (a collation of NGOs based in Hong Kong), Centre 
for the Study of Human Rights at Nankai University, Tianjin and the Institute of 
Law, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing. Of course, a number of other 
stakeholders were located outwith China with views generally not accepted by 
China – Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch were mentioned 
above, and other examples include the Centre of Housing Rights and Evictions 
(Switzerland), the Tibetan UPR forum (a coalition), the World Uyghur Congress 
(USA) and the Falun Gong Human Rights Working Group (USA).
25 Human Rights Council Res. 5/1, supra note 18, ¶ 18.
26 he time limits are intended to insure a degree of parity of treatment of all States.
27 Palestine and the Holy See made contributions to several reviews.
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the working group on each state under review – these reports record the 
interventions made by all states and thus form the basis of the present 
analysis. his report and responses by the state under review are remitted 
to the full Human Rights Council for discussion (the state under review 
is invited to be present and NGOs can make comments at this juncture). 
A decision of the Human Rights Council adopts the inal outcome of the 
review. he latter (inal outcome) is a “perfunctory statement”28 that the 
review has been conducted and comprises the documents noted above 
along with any comments of the state under review.
As is apparent, the interactive dialogue “peer review”29 aspect of the 
process is key to ensuring all states are treated the same and to rendering 
the review transparent.30 Such a public forum also enables monitoring. he 
mechanism is “cooperative” rather than censorial and should fully involve 
the state under review with due consideration of “capacity-building needs” 
of the state.31 his relects the views of the Like Minded Group and, indeed, 
others: Neumayer notes that “for the most part, countries take relatively 
little interest in the extent of human rights violations in other countries.”32 
Universal periodic review has been hailed as “a genuinely innovative 
concept.”33 As such, the success of the review process partly depends on 
28 Human Rights Council Decision 11/110, U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of 
the Human Rights Council on its eleventh session, 56, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/37 (Oct. 
16, 2009) (“he Human Rights Council . . . adopts the outcome of the universal 
periodic review on China which is constituted of the report of the Working 
Group on the review of China (A/HRC/11/25), together with the views of China 
concerning the recommendations and/or conclusions, as well as its voluntary 
commitments and its replies presented before the adoption of the outcome by 
the plenary to questions or issues that were not suiciently addressed during the 
interactive dialogue in the Working Group (A/HRC/11/37, chap. VI)”).
29 On “peer review” as opposed to “periodic review,” see Gaer, supra note 16.
30 Requirements of Human Rights Council Res. 5/1, supra note 18.
31 G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 2, ¶ 5(e).
32 Eric Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for 
Human Rights?, 49 Journal of Conflict Resolution 925-26 (2005).
33 Navanethem Pillay, Human rights in United Nations action: Norms, institutions 
and leadership, European Human Rights Law Review 1, 5 (2009); see also, 
Nazila Ghanea, From UN Commission on Human Rights to UN Human Rights 
Council: One step forward or two steps sideways?, International Comparative 
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how states respond to the call to review other states’ human rights perfor-
mances and, of course, how states react to comments made to them during 
their own review. his was not easy to predict as the system is arguably 
without precedent. Peer review, whilst not unique, is not completely un-
known in transnational and regional organisations. However, the system 
operationalised by the Human Rights Council is without parallel in terms 
of geographical remit,34 subject matter35 and because it is mandatory.36
Literature analyzing aspects of this new mechanism is emerging. 
Reviewing the irst session, Redondo observes that many interventions 
were positive, congratulatory “pats-on-the-back” for states.37 Meanwhile, 
Abebe considers the irst two universal periodic review sessions, noting 
the power of regional alliances in issuing “shaming” criticisms and con-
gratulatory comments during the interactive dialogue (his speciic focus 
was African states though the phenomenon can be observed outwith that 
region),38 whilst Ramcharan notes that the process has “one Achilles heel: 
many member states with atrocious human rights records are treated 
by their peers with kid gloves.”39 Arguably this adds weight to the fears 
expressed by the Like Minded Group – their warning of “the condemn 
Law Quarterly 695, 704 (2006); though see Alston, supra note 7, and Ladan 
Rahmani-Ocora, Giving the Emperor Real Clothes: he UN Human Rights Council, 
12 GLOBAL GOVernance 15 (2006) (noting an earlier, similar (failed) UN peer 
review initiative).
34 he African Peer Review Mechanism, in contrast, is regional and voluntary. 
See generally, African Peer Review Mechanism, www.aprm-au.org; and more 
speciically, see, e.g., Magnus Killander, he African Peer Review Mechanism 
and Human Rights: he irst reviews and the way forward, 30 Human Rights 
Quarterly 41 (2008). 
35 No other such mechanism focuses on all human rights.
36 he IMF and OECD systems are voluntary, as indeed is the African peer review 
system.
37 Elvira Domingues Redondo, he Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights 
Council: An assessment of the irst session, 7 Chinese Journal of International 
Law 721, 731 (2008).
38 Allehone M. Abebe, Of Shaming and Bargaining: African States and the Universal 
Periodic Review of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 9 Human Rights 
Law Review 1, 19 et seq. (2009).
39 Bertrand Ramcharan, The UN Human Rights Council 64 (2011). 
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and the condemned” as quoted above although Alston considers that the 
very concept of universal periodic review responds to previous criticisms 
of both the Like Minded Group and western countries.40 hey argued 
that this would be counter-productive to the goal of encouraging states to 
improve the human rights situation. Certainly a less lexible, “pass/fail” 
style, approach is not likely to prove an incitement to states. he public 
nature of universal periodic review (as noted above all documentation is in 
the public arena and available free online in oicial languages) inevitably 
means states wish at least to be seen to comply with the process and with 
the applicable standards. he inherent vagueness of some human rights 
standards assists in this respect. However, care must be taken to ensure 
that the process is meaningful and promotes progress, rather than just a 
mere paper exercise.
Sweeney and Saito approach the irst two sessions from an NGO 
perspective, raising a number of issues concerning state selectivity of top-
ics raised during the reviews, and a general vagueness of future activity 
based on review outcomes to improve human rights on the ground.41 his 
proved prescient and will be picked up later in this article. Naturally, the 
process is inter-governmental; thus it is not feasible to eradicate politiciza-
tion when the membership of the Council remains states. Nevertheless, 
universal periodic review should include a wider range of participants 
than is the case in other inter-state mechanisms as other stakeholders, 
including NGOs, should be involved at the stage of drating national state 
reports, contributing to the stakeholders report compiled by the Oice of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and reviewing the working 
group’s report during the Human Rights Council session and, of course, 
at the implementation of the review’s accepted recommendations and 
voluntary commitments undertaken by the state within the territory of 
the State concerned.42
In terms of the enabling resolution, the universal periodic review 
process is expected not to present an excessive burden to states, rather 
40 SHA, supra note 9; Alston, supra note 7.
41 Gareth Sweeney & Yuri Saito, An NGO Assessment of the New Mechanisms of the 
UN Human Rights Council, 9 Human Rights Law Review 203 (2009).
42 Id. (expressing caution over the efectiveness of this, based on their observations 
of the initial two sessions of review).
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it is promulgated as complementary to the existing treaty monitoring 
process, something “extra” and worthwhile.43 Few states have ratiied and 
submitted timely reports to all the core U.N. human rights treaty bodies; 
thus the Human Rights Council has a much wider remit than the treaty 
bodies. Moreover, as the universal periodic review process is based on 
the Charter of the U.N., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
voluntary pledges and commitment made by the state under review, as 
well as the treaties to which it is party,44 the scope is considerably broader 
than that of the treaty bodies. Indeed, Gaer argues that universal periodic 
review could provide added value and complements the treaty bodies.45 
His analysis is based on the initial review sessions, thus no comment was 
possible on how the review outcomes would be used by treaty bodies and 
the efect they could have. In any event, it appears that little use is made of 
review outcomes before the treaty bodies although there is some evidence 
of states (including China) using selective treaty reports as a basis for ques-
tions and comments during interactive dialogues.46
For the current paper, China will provide a vehicle for examining the 
review process and the non-confrontational stance espoused by the Like 
Minded Group it headed. Like every other U.N. member state, China can 
participate in the universal periodic review process in two ways: as a re-
viewee, in accordance with the prepared schedule; and as a reviewer. he 
43 “[C]omplement and not duplicate the work of the treaty bodies” quoted in G.A. 
Res. 50/261, supra note 2, ¶ 5(e). 
44 Human Rights Council Res. 5/1, supra note 18, ¶ 1.
45 Gaer, supra note 16, at 136.
46 China cited treaty body reports and those of special procedures with respect to 
Japan. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the 
Universal Periodic Review Japan, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/44 (May 30, 2008). 
On reservations, for example, China welcomed Mauritania’s withdrawal of its 
reservation to CEDAW. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working 
Group on the Universal Periodic Review Mauritania, ¶ 68, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/17 
(Jan. 4, 2011). On ratiications, for example, China’s recommended that Norway 
consider ratifying the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
See U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review Norway, ¶ 105(2), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/5 (Jan. 4, 2010).
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focus of this article is on China as a reviewer, however, it is pertinent to 
irst relect on China’s experience as a reviewee.
3.   CHINA UNDER REVIEW
China was itself reviewed during the fourth session of the first cycle of 
review. Its working group was notable as it attracted one of the largest num-
ber of intervening states of the entire first cycle.47 Of the one hundred and 
fifteen states who sought to comment, sixty were permitted to participate 
in the interactive dialogue with some fifty-five “timed out” (as noted above 
there are strict time limits to ensure equality of treatment of all states48) 
though offered the opportunity of contributing in writing through the 
intranet. In keeping with the then prevailing practice, China was reviewed 
whilst serving as a member of the Human Rights Council.49 That China’s 
working group dialogue attracted considerable interest is not surprising, the 
notable distinction between more critical comments by Western European 
and Others Group (WEOG) and East European EU member states and 
more positive supportive comments by almost every other state perhaps 
was. Several states expressed concern and regret at the politicization of 
human rights situation in China during the review process.50 In the case of 
47 Shortly thereater, the modalities were adjusted and a maximum of sixty states was 
rarely permitted within the time frame of the “face-to-face” interactive dialogue.
48 For summaries on the treatment of People’s Republic of China as compared to 
Nauru, see Rhona Smith, Equality of “Nations Large and Small”: Testing the theory 
of the universal periodic review in the Asia-Paciic, 11 Asia-Pacific Journal on 
Human Rights and The Law Review 36 (2011).
49 Human Rights Council Res. 5/1, supra note 18, Annex ¶ 8, stipulated that each 
state should be reviewed when a member of the Council. his provision has been 
removed. Human Rights Council Res. 16/21, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/21 
(Apr. 12, 2011), provides for the order of review established for the irst cycle to 
be maintained; equitable periodicity thus takes precedence over reviewing States 
during tenure at the Council.
50 For examples of countries commenting on the politicization of human rights 
in China and/or the review process, see U.N. Human Rights Council, Report 
of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review China , ¶ 33 (comments 
by Algeria), ¶ 39 (comments by Sri Lanka), ¶ 88 (comments by Pakistan), ¶ 94 
(comments by Myanmar), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/25 (Oct. 5, 2009). 
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China, arguably the result of the review was, in places, “a thinly veiled and 
fairly coordinated challenge to certain practices – [especially] in China’s 
case its retention and use of capital punishment,”51 the Western European 
and Others Group being particularly vocal in this regard. Of course, China 
retains the death penalty and has not ratified any human rights treaty which 
expressly prohibits its continued use (assuming compliance with minimum 
standards); thus technically it is not required in law to stop the practice. 
Perhaps this partially explains why China did not accept a number of the 
recommendations made during its review. McMahon and Ascherio classi-
fied all recommendations during the first six sessions of the review cycle 
with reference to the degree of action required of the state under review 
to fulfil any given recommendation. They then analysed the number of 
each classification of recommendation which was accepted by the states in 
the various U.N. regional groupings, highlighting some individual states. 
In the case of China, they note that China “accepted all forty-one of Asia 
and Africa’s recommendations, thirty-eight of which fell into categories 
[requiring continuation of existing good practice, sharing of information 
and practice, general acceleration of practices] (by contrast, China only ac-
cepted eight of WEOG’s [Western European and Others Group] sixty-nine 
recommendations, two-thirds of which were in categories [requiring the 
state to consider change or undertake specific action to effect change]).”52 
As noted above, many of these WEOG recommendations related to the 
death penalty. The actual non-acceptance rate is thus arguably less than 
the statistics would suggest. Nevertheless, the death penalty was not the 
sole topic on which China received Western European and Others Group’s 
recommendations. Perhaps the most noteworthy (for the present purpose) 
statistic is the acceptance rate of those recommendations praising Chinese 
practices and progress as, in the next section, the article will note that China 
itself generally contributes such positive, supportive recommendations to 
the reviews of other states. This suggests either such an approach has an 
effective impact on the Chinese government, or such comments are easily 
51 Rhona Smith, More of the Same or Something Diferent? – Preliminary Observations 
on the Contribution of Universal Periodic Review with Reference to the Chinese 
Experience, 10 Chinese Journal of International Law 565, 586 (2011).
52 Edward McMahon & Marta Ascherio, A Step Ahead in Promoting Human Rights? 
he Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council, 18 Global 
Governance 231, 245 (2012).
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achieved and thus almost devoid of meaning as a mechanism for improv-
ing human rights on the ground.
China states that it had “undertaken its irst Universal Periodic Review 
with an open and frank attitude and in a highly responsible manner.”53 
his is obviously a subjective viewpoint but there can be little doubt that 
China’s participation was perhaps more proactive than some detractors 
may have anticipated, with China even considering and responding to 
criticism levied by other states.54 Despite such international comments 
and external praise,55 the review was largely absent in national (Chinese) 
press, with reporting restricted to acknowledgement of the positive com-
ments made by a large number of states.56 China is by no means unique in 
53 Note verbale, supra note 13, at annex; Aide Memoire, infra note 61, ¶ 4.
54 ee, e.g., Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review China, 
supra note 50, for comments made by France which drew on the stakeholders’ 
reports to query various coninement practices as well as making recommendations 
on media practices and the death penalty (¶ 56) while the UK expressed concern 
over the use of the death penalty, issues related to the Tibetan Autonomous Region 
and media freedom (¶ 42).
55 See, e.g, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review China, 
supra note 50, in which Mexico welcomed China’s eforts in the area of human 
rights and the early achievement of the millennium development goals (¶ 38), 
South Africa welcomed the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals 
and China’s collaboration with the OHCHR (¶ 40), Sri Lanka praised China’s 
history efusively (¶ 39), UAE commended China’s progress and policy of openness 
and reform (¶ 53) and Iran commended China’s strong commitment to human 
rights (¶ 59). Even Western European and Others Group states included praise 
in their interventions. See, e.g., the initial comments by Australia (¶ 27), Canada 
(¶ 28), UK (¶ 42), and Sweden (¶ 92). 
56 For the oicial English language newspaper reports, see Human Rights Discourse, 
China Daily, Feb. 11, 2009, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
cndy/2009-02/11/content_7463263.htm, reporting on the irst review and mention 
made further in Rights of Women, Kids, Elderly, Disabled Ensured, China Daily, 
Apr. 14, 2009, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-04/14/
content_7673716.htm.
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this regard. Few states evidence detailed reports in popular media on the 
process or indeed on other U.N. treaty body procedures.
Overall China’s experience was comparable to those of many other 
states. he comments received were if anything more positive when viewed 
in comparison to the reviews of other states - indeed China was the most 
positively rated Asian group country.57 here is thus arguably some evidence 
of states queuing up to praise China’s progress,58 echoing the concerns of 
Abebe, Ramcharan and others.59 However, there was also, indeed, some 
evidence of politicisation, albeit not as much as perhaps was feared.60
4.   CHINA AS A REVIEWER STATE
China’s putative approach to the work of the Human Rights Council was 
indicated in the Aide Memoire submitted in 2006 to support China’s initial 
candidature for the Human Rights Council.61 Therein China notes that 
… the Human Rights Council should respect the historical, cultural 
and religious backgrounds of different countries and regions; . . 
. attach equal importance to civil and political rights on the one 
hand and economic, social and cultural rights on the other/ the 
Council should ensure impartiality, objectivity and non-selectivity 
in the consideration of human rights issues, and the elimination 
57 All reviews of all States have been coded positive or negative. hus it is possible to 
comment on the review of China against the wider context of the entire irst cycle.
58 Very positive reviewers of China include the Report of the Working Group on the 
Universal Periodic Review China, supra note 50, ¶ 29 (comments by Singapore), ¶ 
41 (comments by Saudi Arabia), ¶ 50 (comments by Viet Nam), ¶ 55 (comments 
by India), ¶ 93 (comments by hailand), ¶ 91 (comments by Colombia).
59 See Abebe, supra note 38, Ramcharan, supra note 39; Rosa Freedman, New 
Mechanisms of the UN Human Rights Council, 29 Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights 289 (2011).
60 Several States commented on the politicisation of China’s review although there 
was limited mention of sensitive issues such as the Tibetan Autonomous Region 
/ Tibet and the Uighyurs in Xinjiang (NW China). Supra note 54.
61 Aide Memoire for 2006 inaugural candidature of China to the Human Rights 
Council, available at http://www.un.org/ga/60/elect/hrc/china.pdf.
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of double standards and politicization.62
This statement reflects the views previously expressed by the Like Minded 
Group and which, as noted above, find expression in the enabling resolu-
tions. Three years later, when presenting for re-election, China pledged to 
continue “to take an active part in the work of the Human Rights council 
and the Third Committee of the General Assembly, . . . encouraging the 
above-mentioned institutions to deal with human rights issues in a fair, 
objective and non-selective manner.”63 There is little scope to claim that 
China failed to deliver on its promised involvement in the Council. How-
ever, notwithstanding that fact, it is possible to question the impact of 
China’s involvement – whether it contributed towards the improvement 
of the human rights situation in states.
China has proven to be a very active reviewer state, participating in the 
interactive dialogue of virtually every working group during the irst cycle 
of the review process (and indeed, the initial review of the second cycle).64 
his article considers every intervention made by China during the irst 
cycle of universal periodic review. To do this, the reports of each working 
group were examined, with China’s comments isolated. he principal topics 
mentioned, even in passing, were identiied and listed. A table of subjects 
of most interest to China thus emerged. he frequency with which China 
mentioned these most repeated topics is relected in Figure 1 (Comments by 
China). Note that no judgment is made as to whether China was supportive 
or positive in respect of any single topic for this chart, simply the mention 
of the topic itself was suicient. Moreover, each topic is only recorded once, 
even if China makes repeated mentions of it within any particular report. 
his provides the data for the following analysis.
a.   Topics Addressed by China
In general, a disparate range of topics are covered in each review, occa-
sionally a single topic proves especially popular – e.g. the death penalty 
62 Aide Memoire, supra note 61, at 9.
63 Note verbale, supra note 13, at point 4.
64 China did not comment on very few States and was timed out of commenting on 
a further six (Singapore, Lebanon, Turkey, Italy, Qatar and Nicaragua), though, of 
course, for those States it could ile comments, questions and recommendations 
on the intranet.
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during China’s first review, as noted above. Ramcharan notes a “scatter-
shot process”65 to the selection of topics by member states. This is perhaps 
inevitable as the human rights situation is, of course, different in each 
states. A reviewing state is thus likely to identity different issues in dif-
ferent states. China certainly does this, although the data suggests the 
prevalence of certain topics.
As can be seen (igure one), development issues feature most promi-
nently in the list of topics the Chinese delegation chose to focus on. In 
this category, fulilment of the millennium development goals, economic 
development, social progress, poverty and employment are categorized 
together. Such issues were raised by China in over ninety periodic reviews. 
China’s emphasis on poverty and development, health and education is 
perhaps unsurprising. here are two strands of explanation- irstly, that 
these are rights China considers crucially important and thus prioritises 
or secondly, these are rights which China itself fulils to a greater rather 
than lesser degree. 
On the former, China has long been a proponent of the preeminence of 
basic survival rights such as food, housing, healthcare and the development 
65 Ramcharan, supra note 39, at 55.
FIGURE 1
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through education within a strong institutional structure.66 hese are also 
rights which appear in China’s irst National Human Rights Action Plan 
2009-2010,67 a two year plan published following, but intimated during, 
China’s own periodic review.68 Perhaps they are thus “sot” options upon 
which China can comment from a relative position of strength, whilst still 
accepting advice on good practice to further develop its own position. A 
number of states commented positively on China’s progress on development 
and its fulilment of the millennium development goals.69
he use of universal periodic review as a tool for securing the advance-
ment of economic, social and cultural rights has been questioned and ex-
amined by Duggan-Larkin.70 She notes that there is a degree of selectivity 
evident in the initial years of the process, least developed states facing far 
more questions on economic, social and cultural rights than developed 
states.71 his pattern certainly continued throughout the irst cycle and 
appears to have continued in the initial session of the second cycle. China, 
however, did raise such issues irrespective of the development status of 
the country under review,72 although poverty and “development” are un-
66 White Paper Human Rights in China 1991, supra note 5, Part I, notes that the 
right to subsistence is the foremost human right the Chinese people ight for.
67 National Human Rights Action Plan for China 2009-2010, the Information Oice 
of State Council, 2009 and indeed, subsequently appear in the second national 
plan of action 2012-2015 available online in English translation, available at http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-06/11/c_131645029.htm. 
68 his was welcomed during the working group. See, e.g., Report of the Working 
Group on the Universal Periodic Review China, supra note 50, ¶ 30 (comments 
by Netherlands), ¶ 33 (comments by Algeria), ¶ 44 (comments by Uzbekistan).
69 See, e.g., supra notes 55, 58.
70 Jessica Duggan-Larkin, Can an Intergovernmental Mechanism Increase the 
Protection of Human Rights? he Potential of Universal Review in Relation to the 
Realisation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 28 Netherlands Quarterly 
of Human Rights 548 (2010).
71 Id. at 576.
72 For examples of China’s participation in the reviews of developed States, see, e.g., 
U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 
Review Canada, ¶ 66, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/17; U.N. Human Rights Council, 
Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review New Zealand, ¶ 
64, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/8; U.N. Human Right Council, Report of the Working 
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doubtedly more frequently mentioned in respect of less developed states. 
he fact that economic, social and cultural rights are oten “progressively 
realisable” leads to a necessary lexibility in deining standards.73 here 
are obvious beneits for progressively realizable rights should additional 
technical assistance be forthcoming. his issue is frequently mentioned 
by China, calling for technical assistance in the reports of several states, 
including Mauritania,74 Democratic Republic of the Congo,75 and Af-
ghanistan.76 It will be interesting to discover whether technical assistance 
has been ofered, with those more developed states using the UPR process 
to channel their resources. he evidence so far (from interim reports) is 
not especially positive, but the reality will only become apparent as the 
second cycles reports emerge – part of the focus of the second cycle is to 
Group on the Universal Periodic Review United States of America, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/16/11. All make reference to economic and social rights, including health 
and education.
73 his will prove interesting when the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights enters into force. See, e.g., Malcolm 
Langford, Closing the Gap? – An Introduction to the Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 27 
Nordisk Tidsskrift for Menneskrettigheter 1 (2009); Claire Mahon, 
Progress at the Front: he Drat Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 8 Human Rights 
Law Review 617 (2008). For earlier discussions, see, e.g., Michael Dennis 
and David Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Should there be an international complaints mechanism to adjudicate 
the right to food, water, housing and health?, 98 American Journal of 
International Law 462 (2004); Philip Alston, No Right to Complain 
about being Poor: he need for an Optional Protocol to the Economic Rights 
Covenant, in THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN A CHANGING 
WORLD (A. Eide & Elgesen eds., 1991). 
74 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 
Review Mauritania, ¶ 68, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/17 (Jan. 4, 2011).
75 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 
Review Democratic Republic of the Congo, ¶ 65, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/8 (Apr. 1, 
2010).
76 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 
Review Afghanistan, ¶ 74, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/9 (July 20, 2009).
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consider “the implementation of the accepted recommendations and the 
development in the human rights situation in the state under review.”77 As 
states do not generally refute ofers of technical assistance or recommen-
dations that technical assistance be sought, this could prove informative 
as to whether assistance was forthcoming and had any beneit for human 
rights on the ground.
On the second strand (that China itself adequately fulils the rights 
raised), China is a proponent of the right to development and related rights. 
Indeed China commenced its own interactive dialogue in its working group 
session by highlighting the fact it is the largest developing state in the 
world.78 China has ratiied relevant core treaties such as the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Moreover, in terms 
of the UNDP’s Human Development Index, China has a notable positive 
trajectory over the last thirty years.79 China also secured early achievement 
of Millennium Development Goals. China has a good record of achieve-
ment in respect of development, making substantial progress towards 
achieving and now surpassing the Millennium Development Goals, a key 
indicator of development.80 Within the U.N., the Chinese government have 
long participated in the evolution (from conceptualisation to adoption) of 
the Declaration on the Rights to Development and regularly co-sponsored 
the former Commission on Human Rights’ resolutions on the right to de-
velopment. In the words of the State Council’s 1991 White Paper, “China 
pays close attention to the issue of the right to development.” Support for 
development has continued since the collapse of the Commission. Finally, 
China has education and health as focal points for its current governmen-
tal strategies, which, in human rights terms, ind expression in the irst 
(and indeed now also second) national plan of action for human rights. 
77 G.A. Res. 65/281, supra note 2, at annex, ¶ C.1.6.
78 Report of the Working Group on Universal Periodic Review China, supra note 
50, ¶ 18.
79 UNDP Human Development Index, China, available at http://hdrstats.undp.org/
en/countries/proiles/CHN.html.
80 See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s of Republic of China, 
China’s Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals Report 
2010, available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/MDG/english/
MDG%20Country%20Reports/China/China_MDGReport_2010.pdf.
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Overall, social progress including education and health are central tenets 
of government policy.
Whilst it is undoubtedly easier to manoeuvre standards and espouse 
difering views of progress in respect of economic, social and cultural 
rights as opposed to instantly realizable and challengeable civil and politi-
cal rights, China does comment on a number of issues concerning judicial 
reform in, for example, Poland81 and Bahrain,82 and the status and condi-
tion of prisons and detainees during reviews of various states including 
Zambia,83 Cuba84 and Malta.85 It even comments on the internet, expres-
sion and the need to control pornographic material during the review of 
the Netherlands.86 Of course, China itself prioritises judicial reform in its 
national action plans and other domestic initiatives and makes claims on 
progress in, inter alia, its national plan of action and its statement to the 
working group undertaking its own review.87
hus there is evidence that China elects to comment across the full 
range of human rights,88 not simply economic and social rights. Admittedly, 
81 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Universal Periodic 
Review Poland, ¶ 42, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/30 (May 23, 2008).
82 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Universal Periodic 
Review Bahrain, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/19 (June 9, 2008).
83 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Universal Periodic 
Review Zambia, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/43 (June 2, 2008).
84 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Universal Periodic 
Review Cuba, ¶ 66, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/22 (May 29, 2009).
85 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Universal Periodic 
Review Malta, ¶ 63, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/7 (June 4, 2009).
86 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Universal Periodic 
Review Netherlands, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/31 (May 31, 2008). See also, U.N. 
Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Universal Periodic Review 
Mauritius, ¶ 69, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/28 (Mar. 3, 2009).
87 National Action Plan, supra note 67. See also, Report of the Working Group on 
Universal Periodic Review China, supra note 50, ¶¶ 9-11. Of course, external 
bodies debate China’s progress in some of these ields.
88 See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Universal 
Periodic Review Cameroon, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/21 (May 29, 2009) 
(comments by the Chinese delegation on fair trial rights in Cameroon); U.N. 
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the most common issue raised which can come under civil and political 
rights is discrimination and the treatment of women and children – these 
issues of course appear not only in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, which China has not yet ratiied,89 but also in the 
Conventions on Elimination of Discrimination against Women and on 
the Rights of the Child which it has. he prohibition on discrimination is, 
of course, pervasive; thus it applies also to economic, social and cultural 
rights. As igure 1, series 1 shows, ater development (discussed above) 
China commented most frequently on education, health and discrimina-
tion. China has made signiicant gains in education and health, not least 
as evidenced by China’s success in meeting millennium development goals 
in those areas. Discrimination, as noted above, is pervasive. China has 
commented on discrimination in a number of ields, including gender, 
national minorities, and the urban/rural diferentiation of enjoyment of 
rights. Women and children also featured prominently, in almost ity 
reviews. Both topics were oten raised at once, perhaps indicating China’s 
view that similar issues beset each group. Obviously, China has ratiied 
both the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and thus 
Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Universal Periodic Review 
Monaco, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/3 (June 4, 2009) (torture in Monaco); U.N. 
Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Universal Periodic Review 
Cambodia, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/4 (Jan. 4, 2010) (land reform in Cambodia); 
U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Universal Periodic 
Review Egypt, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/17 (Mar. 26, 2010) (corruption); U.N. 
Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Universal Periodic 
Review Mongolia, ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/5 (Jan. 4, 2011) (environment).
89 In China’s irst commitments and pledges lodged when seeking membership of the 
inaugural Human Rights Council, China stated it was “in the process of amending 
its Criminal Civil and Administrative Procedure Laws and deepening judicial 
reform to create conditions for ratiication at an early date.” Aide Memoire, supra 
note 61, at IV. his disappeared from the pledges and commitments tendered in 
support of its re-election in 2009. Note verbale, supra note 13. he second national 
human rights action plan 2012-2015, published June 2012, notes only that China 
“has continued to carry out administrative and judicial reforms and prepare the 
ground for approval of the ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.’” 
National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012-2015) at part V, ¶ 1, supra 
note 67.
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can mention women and children as key issues, relecting ratiications of 
China and other states, as well as issues of concern for the U.N. generally.90
With respect to treaty obligations, China does not systematically refer 
to the treaty ratiication status and reporting obligations of states. How-
ever, there is evidence of China referring to treaty ratiications during the 
working group dialogues.91 In each of these instances, China is referring 
to treaties which the state has already signed or indicated a willingness 
to accept. Already, the High Commissioner on Human Rights has noted 
the positive efect of universal periodic review on treaty ratiications92 – 
arguably China could thus have made more recommendations concern-
ing treaty ratiication thereby demonstrating a irst step towards impact 
on human rights. On cooperation with the Council, other human rights 
bodies and the OHCHR, China did make several relevant comments. For 
example, China commented on participation with the U.N. treaty bodies 
90 For example, the U.N. created the U.N. Women (http://www.unwomen.org) as 
an umbrella to support women’s empowerment and gender equality. Gender 
mainstreaming remains aspirationally embedded in all U.N. activities. Children 
are considered regularly by the U.N. General Assembly. Most recently, the third 
optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted, 
extending the right of individual communication to victims of infringements of 
that convention. 
91 See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review Jamaica, ¶ 70, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/14, (Jan. 4, 2011); U.N. Human 
Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review USA, 
supra note 72, ¶ 21; U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group 
on the Universal Periodic Review Marshall Islands, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/12 
(Apr. 18, 2011); U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the 
Universal Periodic Review Niger, ¶ 60, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/15 (Mar. 25, 2011).
92 he Secretary-General, United Nations Reform, Measures and Proposals: Note by 
the Secretary-General, p. 18, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/66/860 
(June 26, 2012) (a note by the Secretary-General introducing the Report of the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Strengthening of the Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies).
108 (2011) 17 Asian Yearbook of International Law
for several states, including Indonesia,93 Czech Republic,94and Tunisia.95 
Once again, however, it stopped short of clear criticism of shortcomings. 
China itself pledged to fulil its treaty obligations, “submit timely reports 
on implementation, and conduct constructive dialogues with relevant 
treaty bodies”96 thus (again) is not commenting on anything it does not 
already claim it does.
b.   Nature of Comments Made by China
What is particularly striking when reviewing all China’s interventions 
is the positivity of China’s contributions. Thus in very few situations 
does China request a state to undertake any positive action.97 Rather, the 
Chinese government’s active interventions tend to suggest a state share 
its experiences (thus highlighting good practice) or simply respond to 
requests for further information. Indeed, when all comments made by 
all states are rated positive or negative, to the same criteria, China is the 
most positive Asian participant and, indeed, one of the most positive of 
all states participating in the review process.98 This arguably demonstrates 
China’s understanding that the process should be constructive and non-
93 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 
Review Indonesia, ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/7 (July 5, 2012).
94 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 
Review Czech Republic, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/33 (May. 23, 2008).
95 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 
Review Tunisia, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/5 (July 9, 2012).
96 Note verbale, supra note 13, annexe at point 4.
97 In initial working group reports, the full comment including recommendations 
of the intervening state was noted in one paragraph, the recommendations being 
extracted at the end. In later reviews, the comments appear in order but the 
recommendations are extracted and only appear at the end of the report, with the 
State making the recommendation noted. It is thus possible to ascertain whether 
any State is deemed to have made recommendations, irrespective of the year of 
the review.
98 China’s most negative interventions are in respect of the United States of America, 
see Report of the Working Group on Universal Periodic Review, United States 
of America, supra note 72, ¶ 21; and St Lucia, see U.N. Human Rights Council, 
Report of the Working Group on Universal Periodic Review, Saint Lucia, ¶¶ 89.57, 
89.62, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/6 (Mar. 11, 2011).
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confrontational99 and should ensure fulfilment of the objective of review 
specified by the Human Rights Council,100 including the sharing of best 
practices. This China frequently does. Given the disparate human rights 
situations around the world, it is appropriate to question China’s approach: 
will positive rhetoric really achieve the first objective of the review, viz. 
“[t]he improvement of the human rights situation on the ground,”101 or 
indeed, other objectives such as “fulfillment of the State’s human rights 
obligations”?102 If no positive recommendations are made to seek interna-
tional aid and technical assistance, even those comments of China related 
to that may not achieve their goal.
Some political commentators characterise China’s attitude towards hu-
man rights (and other international issues) as “sot power”103 – a relatively 
subtle diplomatic exercise, little by little extending inluence and reach 
through non-confrontational means, demonstrating by doing, rather than 
pontiicating. By focussing on positives and on development issues, China 
is well-placed to succeed with such an approach, choosing topics in which it 
arguably can claim to lead by example. In human rights terms, this relects 
a pragmatic approach – the process is engaged with without delivering (and 
conversely, inviting) criticism. In any case, it is well-established that states 
are, traditionally, unwilling to comment on the human rights situation in 
another state unless either their nationals are involved104 or the situation 
is such that it could either spill over into their territory (should the state 
be a neighbour) or threaten international peace and security. 
5.   EVALUATION OF CHINA’S CONTRIBUTION
To determine the contribution made by China to the review process, it is 
useful to first revisit the objectives of the first cycle of review. These were 
99 As noted above, see Human Rights Council Res. 5/1, supra note 18, annexe ¶ 3(g), 
and the view of the Like Minded Group.
100 Human Rights Council Res. 5/1, supra note 18, annex ¶ 4.
101 Id. at ¶ 4(a).
102 Id. at ¶ 4(b).
103 See, e.g., Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s soft power 
is transforming the world (Yale University Press 2007), for a fairly polemical 
view of China’s rise against, in particular, the United States.
104 It thus becomes an issue of direct concern to the state.
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stated as being improving the human rights situation and advancing the 
fulfilment of the state’s human rights obligations as noted above,105 as 
well as enhancing the state’s capacity and technical assistance, sharing of 
best practice, support for cooperation and encouragement of engagement 
with the Council, other human rights bodies and the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights.106 First and foremost, universal peri-
odic review should have a demonstrable effect on human rights in every 
state, as noted above, it should not be simply a paper exercise. There are, 
of course, many different options for analysing the interventions made by 
China within the first cycle of universal periodic review. For the purpose 
of this article, the extent to which China is advancing the objectives of the 
review process is deemed central. This will be considered in the closing 
paragraphs. As a precursor, it is useful to first consider whether China’s 
interventions are rooted in reciprocity and then the extent to which the 
comments reflect the tenor of the foundation U.N. documentation which 
tabulates the purpose of the review (General Assembly resolution 60/251 
and Human Rights Council resolution 5/1).
a.   Is Reciprocity a Factor?
China cannot be responding on the basis of reciprocity of comments. As 
noted above, China was not reviewed in the first session of the first cycle of 
reviews and thus commented on countries which did and did not comment 
on it. Furthermore, China participated in reviews of almost every state 
whilst (only) 115 states sought to comment on it. Obviously, maintaining 
such a level of involvement with the entire process allows China to moni-
tor the mechanism by direct observation and participation. Given China’s 
initial concerns over the process evolving into one of condemnation, 
rather than support, this is a sensible strategy. Moreover the topics raised 
by China do not necessarily reflect the topics raised by other states with 
respect to China (see figure 1, Comments on China). During China’s own 
review, development issues (usually praise for China) then institutional is-
sues (primarily ratification of treaties and institutional reforms of national 
bodies) were raised repeatedly. Although not shown on the comparative 
figure, the next most popular topic raised in comments on China was civil 
105 Supra note 16 et seq.
106 Human Rights Council Res. 5/1, supra note 18, annexe ¶ 4 (a)-(f).
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and political rights drawn primarily from the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, to which China is not a party. Religious freedom, 
freedom of expression and freedom of association were frequently raised 
and inevitably China was criticized (as noted above, primarily by members 
of the WEOG group) for failing to reach the required standards. Although 
China has not ratified the International Covenant, it does accept, indeed 
its representatives helped to draft,107 the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights which also proclaims expression and religion as basic freedoms. 
Moreover, the White Paper and the subsequent papers and national plans 
of action also contain detailed provision on this.108
As igure 1 shows, ater development (discussed above) China com-
mented most frequently on education, health and discrimination. hese 
were also popular topics to raise in respect of China’s review. Education 
and health are two issues in which China has demonstrated considerable 
success (again, discussed above). Discrimination is pervasive across many/
all rights and freedoms. For the purpose of igure 1, the main issues com-
mented on involved gender-based discrimination, national minorities 
and discrimination of rural dwellers as opposed to urban dwellers. he 
latter is an acknowledged issue in China which the government claims to 
be addressing.109 China also regularly commented on issues concerning 
women and children, making interventions on each (and usually both) in 
some ity state reviews. Although similar issues were raised in respect of 
China, the numbers of comments are far less than those on institutional 
issues, minorities (status of rather than discrimination) and the judicial 
system. Even on a state by state review, there is little evidence that China 
raises topics which were raised in respect of it speciically by any state.
b.   Are the UN Guidelines Followed?
China’s approach may be considered to follow, almost exactly, the guid-
ance issued by the General Assembly and then the Human Rights Council. 
Almost every state under review has ratified the U.N. Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, most have also ratified the Convention on the Elimi-
107 Dr. Peng Chun Chang of China helped drat the Universal Declaration.
108 Supra note 5; National Action Plans, supra note 67.
109 National report submitted by China, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/4/CHN/1 and 
national action plans, supra note 67.
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nation of Discrimination Against Women and the two international cov-
enants (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). Accordingly, under 
the relevant resolution, these issues fall within not only the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights but also the human rights instruments to 
which a state is party.110 Moreover, addressing these rights and freedoms 
meets the objectives of improving human rights in the country under 
review, progressing the fulfilment of the state’s human rights obligations 
and enhancing the state’s capacity.111
China certainly made frequent reference to the need for international 
technical aid and assistance to help countries combat poverty and devel-
op.112 he principal argument against such an approach is that China elected 
to make very few concrete recommendations to states under review, not 
even regularly recommending that technical assistance be sought. his 
can be problematic although it is acknowledged that there is a narrow line 
between support and interference. China has long maintained that the 
international community has little right to interfere in matters deemed 
within national sovereignty. It is thus not especially surprising that it 
takes a non-interventionist approach to the human rights situation within 
other states.113 However, does that really help the universal periodic review 
process improve the human rights situation on the ground? It is submit-
ted that it does not. China’s approach tends to the highlighting of good 
110 Human Rights Council Res. 5/1, supra note 18, at annexe ¶¶ 1(b)-(c).
111 Id. ¶¶ 4(a)-(c).
112 See, e.g., Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, supra note 75, ¶ 65; Report of the Working 
Group on the Universal Periodic Review Afghanistan, supra note 76, ¶ 74.
113 A much debated example of this is the Chinese government’s negotiations based 
on the potential invocation of veto in the Security Council when discussing issues 
related to interventions in third States. For example, China abstained from the vote 
authorizing military enforcement of a no-ly zone ostensibly to protect civilians in 
Libya. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ 
Over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, By Vote of 
10 in Favour With 5 Abstentions, U.N. Doc. SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011). However, 
the threat of veto by China and Russia has prevented the Security Council from 
taking action (as of the submission of this article) in respect of Syria. In 19 July 
2012, China and Russia vetoed a drat resolution on sanctions which could not 
then proceed to a formal resolution.
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practice with little mention, particularly when dealing with less developed 
states, of action conducive to the improvement of the prevailing human 
rights situation. However, as noted above,114 China did not accept many 
recommendations for concrete change within its own territory during its 
review. It would thus be hypocritical for the Chinese government to take 
a more proactive, interventionist stance towards other states. In spite of 
the foregoing, China did make several references to national human rights 
institutions. hese are, of course, considered to be beneicial in promoting 
the protection of international human rights within states,115 although 
China does not have one. It is thus perhaps striking that the state chose to 
comment on national institutions in several working group dialogues.116 
he prevailing U.N. view is undoubtedly that national human rights in-
stitutions should be encouraged. Indeed, considerable eforts are ongoing 
in Asia and the Paciic, for example, supporting the establishment of such 
bodies in states in the region.
China clearly projects a very non-confrontational stance, one which 
many commentators consider to be predicated on geography and/or devel-
opment. McMahon and Ascherio,117 Freedman118and Abebe119 are amongst 
the commentators noting a north-south divide, or to be more precise, West-
114 U.N. Human Rights Council, Final Outcome of the Universal Periodic Review, 
China, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/37 (June 3, 2009); Human Rights Decision 11/110, 
supra note 12; McMahon & Ascherio, supra note 52.
115 Paris Principles relating to the Status of National Human Rights Institutions, 
G.A. Res. 48/134 (Dec. 20, 1993); see also, Human Rights Council Res. 9/12, U.N. 
Human Rights Council, UN Voluntary Goals on Human Rights, article 1(c), U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/RES/9/12 (Sept. 18, 2009).  
116 See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review Mali, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/50 (June 13, 2008); U.N. Human 
Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Sri 
Lanka, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/46 (June 5, 2008); U.N. Human Rights Council, 
Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Cyprus, ¶ 66, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/13/7 (Jan. 4, 2010); U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the 
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Suriname, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/18/12 (Oct. 22, 2010).
117 McMahon & Ascherio, supra note 52.
118 Freedman, supra note 59.
119 Abebe, supra note 38.
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ern European and Others Group augmented by EU members of the Eastern 
European bloc against the rest of the U.N. Western and Eastern European 
states are of course all subject to fairly robust human rights standards 
through the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights, overseen 
by the European Court of Human Rights. Other members of the Western 
Europe and Others Group have their own strong national systems: Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand, for example. A more adversarial type of ap-
proach is thus normal in these states and human rights standards prevalent 
in each state are regularly challenged in courts and tribunals. However, 
these are also relatively established, developed states, ranking amongst the 
highest levels of development in the world. hey thus may view the periodic 
review process more as mechanism for fast-tracking states to higher levels 
of compliance with human rights than a means to discuss problems and 
challenges. For China, a much more literal approach is taken to ensuring 
the review process is cooperative, non-judgmental, etc. Whether this will 
result in positive changes remains to be seen. For sure, most African and 
Asian states take a similar approach to that evinced by China. Neumayer120 
is one commentator noting the general reluctance of states to criticise each 
others’ human rights performance. In part this reticence can be traced 
to a fundamental tenet of public international law – non-interference in 
national sovereignty,121 a doctrine China avidly supports.122
6.   CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Without doubt China is notable in the working group reports as making 
very supportive and encouraging comments to some of the least devel-
oped states on earth, drawing attention to small gains and the presence 
of political will for change. This certainly permits China to claim credit 
in its promotion of human rights around the world.123 However, the lack 
120 Neumayer, supra note 32.
121 U.N. Charter article 2(7).
122 See, e.g., supra note 113.
123 CHEN Dingding explores the growth of China’s participation in international 
human rights in Dingding Chen, China’s Participation in the International 
Human Rights Regime: A state identity perspective, 2 Chinese Journal of 
International Politics 399 (2009). See also, Bjorn Ahl, Statements of the Chinese 
Government before the Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Doctrine and practice of treaty 
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of criticism and constructive comments requiring positive action belies 
passivity on the part of China. Arguably, it is all show – overt indication of 
a willingness to participate occluding a lack of engagement with proactive 
change agents within states. China’s involvement in the process is perhaps 
inevitable, given how hard it lobbied for a softly approach. It would be 
hypocritical of it to then absolve itself of participation. Although China can, 
on the basis of statistics, claim to be an active participant, it is clear that 
China’s involvement is more passive than active. China’s involvement is a 
classic case of “much ado about nothing” – justifying a fanfare and claims 
of “credit” on the international stage, without any underpinning substance.
It can be averred that China’s successful negotiation, on behalf of the 
Like Minded Group, of a more “watered-down” version of universal pe-
riodic review than perhaps would otherwise have been the case, marked 
China’s card. It was not open to China to do anything other than go along 
with the new mechanism; ater all, it had in efect got what it wanted and 
thus was under a moral obligation to demonstrate willingness. For China, 
this is a “win, win” situation as China’s participation is unequivocal evi-
dence of its participation in the U.N. human rights system. hat China has 
fully engaged with the process is beyond question even although there are 
criticisms that China’s participation has skewed the process away from a 
critical analysis of state performance.
At the inaugural session of the Human Rights Council, the Vice 
Minister of Foreign Afairs of the People’s Republic of China concluded his 
remarks with the following words of an ancient Chinese poem: “[t]he 
new will invariably supersede the old, and change is expected of every 
generation.”124 he veracity of that statement with respect to international 
human rights monitoring in incontestable. Whether H.E. Mr Yang’s aspira-
tion that “the Human Rights Council will go farther along the right track 
implementation, 12 Australian Journal of Asian Law 82 (2012), which analyses 
many of the apparent inconsistencies with the approach of the government to 
the treaty bodies. For a general review of China’s evolving role, see Bjorn Ahl, 
Exploring Ways of Implementing International Human Rights Treaties in China, 
28 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 361 (2010).
124 YANG Jiechi, Vice Minister of Foreign Afairs of the People’s Republic of China 
at the Inaugural Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council Geneva, p. 
5 (June 20, 2006), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/
docs/statements/china.pdf.
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and make greater contribution to improving human well-being”125 is less 
obvious. China has undoubtedly been an active and vocal participant in 
universal periodic review thus it would appear the Chinese government 
considers universal periodic review to be the “right track” for monitoring 
human rights. What is diicult is determining the extent to which China’s 
positive, supportive interventions actually contribute to “improving human 
well being,” and, of course, the “human rights situation on the ground.” 
China has good form with active participation in universal periodic review, 
the substantial beneits however remain to be seen.
POSTSCRIPT 
Since this article was finalised, China has been re-elected to the Human 
Rights Council for a full three year term (2014-2016) and has completed 
its second cycle universal periodic review (October 2013, working group 
interactive dialogue; February 2014, China’s views on recommendations 
communicated).
125 Id.
